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Abstract 
What determines people’s moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people’s 
normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and 
social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We used experimental survey 
methods to investigate people’s moral judgments empirically, and explored whether we could 
influence subsequent judgments by deliberately making some individuals happier. We found that 
moral judgments of selfish behaviors in the economic context depend strongly on other people’s 
behaviors, but their relationships are significantly moderated by an increase in happiness for the 
person making the judgment. 
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In a seminal study of moral judgments in economics, Cubitt and co-authors (2011) show, 
using experimental survey methods, that free riding in public-good games is typically judged 
to be morally reprehensible by impartial observers, except when it is carried out in response 
to previous free riding by the other co-player. 
Cubitt et al.’s study is one of the first to offer economists important insights into the 
formation of moral judgments of free riding. It also calls for further investigations into the 
moral foundations of behaviors in other economic contexts. For example, research in the 
laboratory and in the field has shown that, when firms offer employees a wage above that of 
the competitive equilibrium level, workers will typically reciprocate positively by exerting 
higher effort levels even when they are not contractually obligated to do so (Fehr et al., 1993; 
Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Kube et al., 2012). Such positive reciprocal behaviors, which may 
arise not necessarily because actors expect future material benefits from their action but as a 
response to other people’s friendly gestures, are well documented in the economics literature 
(for a comprehensive review, see Fehr and Gächter, 2000). However, it does not 
automatically follow that a worker’s decision not to reciprocate positively to the firm’s “gift” 
would have been deemed morally wrong by an impartial observer. On the contrary, a 
nonreciprocal action might have even been deemed morally acceptable in the eyes of self-
interest – or in moral psychology, egotistical – agents (Sanders, 1988). A similar argument 
can be made to describe the typical behaviors in experimental trust games (Berg et al., 1995; 
Camerer, 2003; McCabe et al., 2003). Would it be considered morally wrong for subjects not 
to trust or reciprocate trust in an anonymous exchange setting? Because empirical evidence in 
this area is currently scarce, little is understood about the constructs of moral judgments of 
selfish behaviors in economics.  
A related question of interest is whether moral judgments of selfish behaviors in 
economics, like many other types of judgments on typical ethical dilemmas studied in moral 
psychology, are subject to emotional influences. While rationalist models of moral judgments 
have long dominated the field of moral psychology (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983), research 
by psychologist Jonathan Haidt has provided convincing evidence that moral judgments may 
not have been the outcome of reasoning and reflection. Rather, perceived moral violations 
tend to invoke specific negative feelings such as contempt, anger, or disgust, and it is these 
emotional processes that influence the way we ultimately form our intuitive moral judgments 
(Haidt et al., 1993; Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Hersh, 2001). Figure 1 provides a simple graphical 
illustration of the various processes through which individuals may arrive at their moral 
judgments in rationalist and emotionalist models. 
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Haidt’s research has also influenced the development of the “dual process” theory of moral 
judgment, in which, perhaps because of earlier evolutionary development, characteristically 
deontological moral judgments (e.g., judgments associated with concerns for “rights” and 
“duties”) are driven by automatic emotional responses, whereas characteristically utilitarian 
or egoistic moral judgments (e.g., judgments aimed at promoting the “greater good” or 
“individual self-interest”) are driven by more controlled cognitive processes (Green, 2007; 
Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008).  
Whereas these emotional and cognitive processes often work in unison to arrive at a 
decision that satisfies the goals of both, many decisions in economics require individuals to 
endorse violation of potentially deontological moral codes in order to satisfy an individual’s 
self-interest. For example, recipients in trust and gift exchange games will have to forego 
reciprocity in order to maximize their financial payoff. However, laboratory evidence 
suggests that nonreciprocity rarely happens, even though it may seem logical from the selfish 
agent’s point of view to do so.1 One reason for this may be that the thought of not 
reciprocating triggers activation in emotion-related brain centers, which in turn elicits 
automatic negative reactions that appear designed to inhibit such morally reprehensible acts. 
In other words, if we can somehow suppress our automatic negative emotional reaction to 
nonreciprocity, then it may be possible for us to feel reasonably “okay” about other people’s 
selfish behaviors in general (Green et al., 2004).  
Given these findings, recent research in psychology suggests that it may be possible to 
influence an individual’s moral judgment through the manipulation of his or her affects. 
Because affective states act as momentary informational signals regarding the environment 
(Schwarz and Clore, 1996), social psychologists such as Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) 
propose that environment-induced feelings of positivity at the time of judgment may reduce 
the perceived negativity, or aversion “signal,” of any potential moral violation, thereby 
subconsciously allowing individuals to become less judgmental when forming their 
1
 This is similar to the responses received on the well-known footbridge dilemma in which the lives of five people can be saved through 
sacrificing another person by pushing a large man off a footbridge to stop a runaway trolley before it kills the five. Most people believe it 
wrong to push him, even though not pushing him will result in a greater number of deaths (Green et al., 2004). 
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normative attitudes toward consequentialist behaviors such as actions that only satisfy their 
own self-interests or well-being. 2 
The current study contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we extended 
Cubitt et al.’s work on free riding and conducted experimental surveys on the normative 
attitudes of impartial observers toward selfish behaviors in trust and gift exchange games. We 
asked: If judgment is not confounded with self-interest from being an affected party, are other 
people’s self-interest behaviors in trust and gift exchange games still judged to be wrong? If 
so, what factors influence how severe a transgression it is seen as?  
Our second contribution to the economics literature lies in testing whether moral judgments 
of selfish economic behaviors are, like moral judgments typically studied in other disciplines, 
functions of positive emotions. Specifically, we tested whether induced positive emotions in 
the laboratory can influence the treated subjects to become less judgmental of other people’s 
selfish behaviors in trust and gift exchange games. Simply put, we experimentally 
investigated whether, compared to the controls, the treated individuals were more likely to 
view self-interested behaviors in others as morally acceptable once we were able to reduce 
any perceived negativity toward nonreciprocal actions by making them momentarily happier 
at the time of judgment. Our main conclusions are that (i) there is a moral element to others’ 
nonreciprocal actions, and (ii) positive moods reduce subjects’ tendency to judge harshly on 
others’ egotistical behaviors.3 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the experimental design and 
hypotheses of the experiment. We analyze and report our findings in Section II. Section III 
concludes. 
2
 In their work, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) use survey experimental methods to demonstrate that participants responding to the 
footbridge dilemma tend to offer a more utilitarian response (i.e., killing one to save five) after watching a funny clip from the TV show 
Saturday Night Live as opposed to a neutral control clip. 
3
 It should be noted that we are not the first to study the causal link between emotions and decision making in economically relevant 
contexts. For example, Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) demonstrate that, within a gift exchange game experiment, players with a bad mood tend to 
be more reciprocal in their behaviors, whereas players with a good mood tend to behave more generously and transfer more endowment to 
the other player. Studies have also found that happier individuals are typically healthier (Davidson et al., 2010), risk averse (Goudie et al., 
2013), more patient (Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011), more productive (Oswald et al., 2013), and earn more income (DeNeve and Oswald, 
2012). 
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I. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
A. Experimental Design 
The main goal of our experiment was to investigate how moral judgments in trust and gift 
exchange games are formed and whether they are functions of changes in positive emotions. 
In this section, we present the design used to address our research questions.  
The experiment consisted of two treatments: the “Happy-treatment” (H-treatment) and the 
“Neutral-treatment” (N-treatment). The H-treatment and the N-treatment differ only with 
respect to the manipulation of individuals’ emotional states. Subjects in each treatment were 
required to complete two sets of identical questionnaires: once before receiving the relevant 
treatment, and once directly after.  
We were also interested in eliciting individual’s moral judgments as impartial observers of 
other people’s behaviors in two economic conditions, namely, in the trust game (TRUST) and 
in the gift exchange game (GEG). This gave us a 2 × 2 experimental design, i.e., (N-
treatment, TRUST condition), (H-treatment, TRUST condition), (N-treatment, GEG 
condition), and (H-treatment, GEG condition). 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were asked to rate on a seven-point scale their 
current emotional states, with the scale ranging from “1 – no intensity at all” to “7 – high 
intensity.” We elicited six emotions: happiness, envy, anger, boredom, contentment, and 
irritation. As mentioned, our focus is on the interaction between positive emotions (namely, 
happiness and contentment) and moral judgments.    
Similar to Cubitt et al.’s work, the moral judgment questionnaire asked subjects to rate, as 
an impartial observer, the actions of others in either a trust game or a gift exchange game. It 
principally described a decision problem for two fictitious players, named Person A and 
Person B, then gave some possible endings, each of which specified players’ choices and 
their consequences. Each questionnaire consisted of five scenarios with the same decision 
problem, but different endings. Within each questionnaire, the behavior of Person A varied 
across scenarios, but Person B was always selfish. After each ending, subjects were asked to 
rate the morality of Person B. We measured moral ratings on a scale from −50 (extremely 
bad) to +50 (extremely good). 
To assess the impact of induced positive emotions on moral judgments, we used a 
methodological approach common in psychology whereby external stimuli (such as a short 
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video clip) are employed to induce particular feelings (Westermann et al., 1996).4 For the H-
treatment, subjects watched a short video clip where passengers were dancing in a train 
station.5 This “Happy” video clip was meant to induce participants’ positive emotional states. 
For the N-treatment, subjects watched a short video clip depicting sea waves. This film is 
considered “neutral” by social psychologists, and its purpose was not to alter participants’ 
moods.6 After mood induction had taken place, subjects were asked to respond to the same 
questionnaire that they had received before the video clip. The experiment was concluded by 
the completion of a postexperimental questionnaire, where we collected data on the subjects’ 
demographic characteristics. The order of the tasks that subjects were required to perform 
within a condition is summarized in Figure 2. 
By analyzing the link between subjects’ self-reported positive emotions and moral 
judgments at the start of the experiment (before the video clip), we can assess whether these 
two responses are interrelated. By comparing the differences in induced self-reported positive 
emotional ratings within a given condition (before and after the mood induction process), we 
can make causal inferences on whether differences in moral judgments can be attributed to 
individuals’ shift of self-reported positive emotions. Below, we present in detail the specifics 
of each questionnaire in the TRUST and the GEG condition, separately. 
Questionnaire for the TRUST Condition.—Under this condition, fictitious players in the 
hypothetical scenarios are paired up. Person A, who moves first, must decide how much 
money is to be given to Person B, the second mover. The amount sent is multiplied by a 
factor of 3, and Person B must decide how much money is to be sent back to Person A. The 
first mover’s action to send money to the second mover measures trust, whereas the amount 
returned by the second mover to the first mover measures trustworthiness. The actual 
description of the decision situation in the TRUST condition, along with the first scenario, is 
shown below. 
4
 Exposing subjects to short video clips has been suggested as one of the most successful emotion-induction procedures and to minimize 
experimenter demand effects (e.g., Clark, 1983; Martin, 1990). 
5
 The happy video clip was part of T-Mobile’s advertisement campaign and can be found online at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQ3d3KigPQM 
6
 The neutral video clip was “Waves” on the Stanford Psychophysiology Laboratory resources’ website 
(http://spl.stanford.edu/resources.html). 
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Imagine a group that consists of two members, Person A and Person B. Person A receives an endowment 
of 20 pounds and has to decide how many pounds to keep for himself and how many to transfer to Person 
B. The amount of pounds that Person B receives from Person A is tripled. Then Person B has to decide 
how many pounds from this tripled amount to send back to Person A. The total income of Person A is his 
endowment of 20 pounds minus the amount of pounds he transfers to Person B plus the amount of pounds 
he receives back from Person B. The total income of Person B is the amount of pounds he receives from 
Person A multiplied by 3 minus the amount of pounds he sends back to Person A. Assume that Person A 
decides first and Person B observes Person A’s choice before making his own decision. 
A) Assume that Person A transfers 0 pounds to Person B and Person B sends back 0 pounds to Person A.
Therefore, as a result of their decisions, Person A’s total income is 20 pounds and Person B’s total 
income is 0 pounds. How do you rate Person B’s morality? 
Over the other four remaining scenarios, Person A becomes more trusting of Person B, and 
his transfer increases to £20 in increments of £5. Person B is always selfish and returns £0. 
Because Person A’s trust is not reciprocated by Person B’s action, the payoff gap between the 
two players increases. In the first scenario, Person A earns more than Person B, because both 
players behave in a selfish way. In the second scenario, both players earn exactly the same 
amount of money: £15. For the remaining three scenarios, Person A continues to increase the 
amount of money he is transferring to Person B, thus increasing the income gap as we move 
toward the last scenario. 
Questionnaire for the GEG Condition.—Again, fictitious players in the hypothetical 
scenarios are paired up, with one receiving the role of the “Employer” (first mover) and the 
other the “Employee” (second mover). The first move involves the employer setting the 
employee’s wage level, and the second move involves the employee choosing an effort level 
to contribute to the firm. The trust and the gift exchange game have similar aspects in their 
structure, in the sense that the first mover shows trust to the second mover. Yet the 
description of the gift exchange game adds more social context in the decision situation 
facing each player, as opposed to the case of the trust game, where the actual framing of the 
scenarios is more neutral. The description of the decision situation in the GEG condition, 
along with the first scenario, is shown below. 
Imagine a group that consists of two members, Person A and Person B. Person A, who is in the role of 
Employer, decides to offer a wage to Person B, who is in the role of Employee. Person A can choose a 
wage of 5, 10, 15, 20 or 25 pounds. Then Person B has to decide how much effort to spend. Person B can 
choose an effort level of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. The total income of Person A is the effort level spent by Person B 
multiplied by 25 minus the amount of wage he offers to Person B. The total income of Person B is the 
amount of wage he receives from Person A minus the cost of his effort level, which is equal to the effort 
level he chose. Assume that Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A’s choice before 
making his own decision. 
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A) Assume that Person A offers a wage of 5 pounds to Person B and Person B chooses an effort level
equal to 1. Therefore, as a result of their decisions, Person A’s total income is 20 pounds and Person B’s 
total income is 4 pounds. How do you rate Person B’s morality? 
The scenarios differ from each other only in Person A’s behavior. Person A’s wage offer is 
£5 (as shown) in the first scenario, rising to £25 in increments of £5 over the other four 
scenarios. Again, the judged player, Person B, does not reciprocate back (by always choosing 
the lowest possible effort level) toward the nonjudged player, Person A. As a result of their 
decisions, the income for Person A is greater than that of Person B for the first two scenarios, 
whereas the income for Person B is greater than that of Person A in the last three scenarios. 
Procedures: The experiment was conducted in the Centre for Experimental Economics 
(EXEC) laboratory at the University of York, UK. We recruited participants from a 
university-wide pool of undergraduate and postgraduate students who had already indicated 
their willingness to participate in economic experiments. The experiment was computerized, 
and the subjects were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). All sessions used 
an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned a computer screen. They 
were informed that the session consisted of two sections. However, they were not told what 
would happen in the second section, to reduce the possibility for having wrong expectations 
about the nature of the experiment. The set of instructions for both sections was displayed on 
their computer screens. Subjects were allowed to ask questions by raising their hands and 
speaking to the experimenter in private. They were not allowed to communicate with one 
another throughout the session.  
Subjects were randomly allocated into different treatments and conditions. Each subject 
could participate in only one session, which consisted of two identical questionnaires. 
Therefore, our design also allowed us to perform within-subjects tests (i) for the impact of the 
video clip (either happy or neutral) on self-reported positive emotions and (ii) for differences 
in moral judgments before and after subjects had been exposed to the video clip. 
In our experiment, we could not incentivize task-responses, although we could incentivize 
participation. Because our objective was to study subjects’ impartial moral attitudes, a 
questionnaire-based approach was appropriate for this purpose because any means of tying 
payments to subjects’ responses could confound the way they report their attitudes (Cubitt et 
al., 2011). Given the absence of task-related incentives, we paid subjects a show-up fee of £5. 
The payment of a fixed amount of money to participants is common practice in survey-based 
experiments. No session lasted more than 30 minutes. In total, 237 subjects took part in our 
experiment: 129 subjects participated in the H-treatment, and 108 subjects participated in the 
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N-treatment. Table 1 shows the number of subjects in each treatment and condition 
separately. 
 
II. Results
A. How do People Judge Selfish Behaviors in Others? 
Prior to examining the impact of happiness on moral judgments, we first explore how 
people rated the scenarios in each condition separately. Recall that in each scenario, the 
judged player is always acting selfishly, whereas his co-player’s behavior is becoming 
increasingly prosocial. To understand how individuals morally rate the selfish actor when 
they are initially faced with a decision situation, we focus on the initial phase of moral 
judgment elicitation. Because it may be that different moral judgments are expressed across 
treatments and within conditions, we first determine whether there are any differences in 
moral judgments between the H- and the N-treatment. A rank-sum Wilcoxon test produces 
statistically insignificant differences within a given condition between the H- and the N-
treatment both for the TRUST condition (p-values > 0.332) and for the GEG condition (p-
values > 0.108). We therefore pool these two treatments in the analysis of this section. 
The main tool for our analysis is the mean evaluation function (MEF), which gives the 
average moral ratings that subjects assigned to the judged player as a function of the behavior 
of the nonjudged co-player. Figure 3 shows the MEF for each of our two conditions. In all 
graphs, the horizontal axis indicates the behavior of the nonjudged player (Person A). For the 
TRUST condition, the horizontal axis indicates the amount of pounds sent by Person A to 
Person B, whereas, for the GEG condition, the amount of wage paid by Person A to Person B 
is indicated on the horizontal axis. In both games, Person B is selfish, and the average moral 
ratings that subjects assigned to Person B are shown on the vertical axis. Ratings below 
(above) 0 indicate a morally blameworthy (praiseworthy) action, and ratings of 0 indicate that 
the action is perceived to be of no moral significance. 
Two striking observations emerge from Figure 3. First, the MEF in both conditions is 
generally downward sloping. This suggests that as Person A became increasingly prosocial, 
subjects became increasingly condemning toward Person B’s selfish actions. Second, subjects 
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morally perceived selfishness on a known selfish actor as being morally praiseworthy. This 
pattern is observed in both TRUST and GEG conditions. In particular, when Person A sends 
either £0 or £5 to Person B, subjects perceived not returning anything back as not being 
immoral. In addition, choosing the lowest possible effort level is morally acceptable when the 
wage offered by the employer (Person A) is the minimum one. 
As a further step to better understanding how subjects assigned their moral ratings, we 
divide their response patterns into three categories: (i) negatively sloped MEFs; (ii) flat 
MEFs; and (iii) other MEFs, which include positively sloped and nonmonotonic MEFs. The 
proportions of subjects that belong to one of these three categories in each condition are 
shown in Table 2. 
A common pattern of judgment that emerges from Table 2 is that the 
overwhelming majority of subjects have a negatively sloped MEF. This implies that 
subjects became increasingly more condemning toward Person B when Person A became 
more prosocial and Person B observed Person A’s action. Yet only a small percentage 
of subjects passed judgments on Person B that are independent of Person A’s behavior. 
Our evidence clearly indicates that subjects perceived selfish behaviors as immoral acts, 
except when a selfish action was known to the judged co-player (in which case, 
selfishness was perceived to be morally acceptable). In addition, subjects did not assign 
neutral moral ratings in the vast majority of cases, indicating that they perceived selfish 
actions as having a moral dimension. These two observations agree with earlier 
experimental investigations that elicited individuals’ impartial moral judgments in social 
dilemma games using hypothetical scenarios (see Cubitt et al., 2011). We summarize our 
first finding below. 
Finding 1.—On average, subjects perceived acting in a selfish manner as having a 
moral dimension. Most subjects increased their moral condemnation toward the selfish 
actor the more prosocial his co-player became. 
B. What are the Relationships Between Emotions and Moral Judgments? 
In this section, we analyze associations at the cross section between emotions and moral 
judgments. We first look at some descriptive statistics of each of the six self-reported 
emotions we elicited at the beginning of a session. Recall that emotions were elicited on a 
seven-point scale, with 1 indicating no intensity at all, and 7 indicating high intensity. Table 3 
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reports the average levels and standard deviation for each treatment and emotion, separately. 
Note that the emotions with the highest levels are happiness and contentment both in the 
TRUST condition (4.906 and 4.530, respectively) and in the GEG condition (5.058 and 
4.333, respectively). The emotion with the lowest intensity was anger: Subjects reported a 
value of 1.897 in the TRUST condition and 1.842 in the GEG condition.  
 
We next assess whether there are significant associations between positive emotional 
responses and moral judgments in the directions that are consistent with the dual-process 
theory of moral judgments, i.e., happy people are expected to be less morally condemning 
toward other people’s egotistical behaviors. Because happiness and contentment were 
assigned the highest values, and thus indicated as the positive emotions triggered mostly, we 
consider both of these positive emotions in our ordinary least-squares regression analyses 
(Table 4). In these regressions, the dependent variable is the moral rating assigned by a 
subject to a given scenario. As independent variables, we include four dummy variables, 
which take the value 1 for a given scenario (our baseline category, which is excluded from 
the regressions, is scenario 1), the self-reported levels of happiness and contentment, 
subject’s gender (1 if female, 0 if male), field of study (1 if they study economics, 0 
otherwise), and nationality (1 if British, 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors are reported in 
Table 4 in parentheses. 
A first observation from our regression analysis is that the scenario dummies have negative 
and statistically significant coefficients different from zero (with the only exception that of 
the dummy for scenario 2 in the regression of the TRUST condition). This implies that the 
MEF is on average negatively sloped in both conditions, with the size of the coefficients 
increasing as we move to scenario 5. We also find evidence suggesting that happiness and 
contentment explain how subjects morally judged Person B’s selfish actions. More 
specifically, people who reported higher levels of happiness assigned significantly higher 
moral ratings (the coefficient of the variable “happiness” is positive and statistically 
significant at the five percent level), indicating that, at the cross section, happier people tend 
to judge others’ egotistical behaviors less harshly. A similar conclusion carries over when we 
look at the regression model for the GEG condition. Here, the coefficient of the variable 
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“contentment” is positive and significant at the five percent level. The results are robust to 
regression models that replace the four scenario dummy variables with one variable that takes 
the value of the amount sent/wage (depending on the condition) offered by Person A in each 
scenario separately.7 It is also interesting that nationality is a determinant of how subjects 
morally evaluated selfishness. In both regression models, British subjects were significantly 
more judgmental than non-British subjects. We summarize our second finding below. 
Finding 2.—There are significant cross-sectional links between positive emotions and moral 
judgments. Subjects who reported to be happier and more content typically assigned higher 
moral ratings toward a selfish actor. 
C. The Impact of Induced Positive Emotions 
Was the Happy Video Successful at Inducing Positive Emotions?—We ran the following 
regressions to test whether watching the “Happy” video clip significantly improved 
individuals’ happiness:  
(1) ,_ ijijjjij εtreatmentHβαHb 000 ++=  
(2) ,_ ijijjjij εtreatmentHβαHa 111 ++=  
(3) ,_)( ijijjjijij εtreatmentHβαHbHa 222 ++=−  
where i = 1, ..., N and j = 1,..., J; ijHb  and ijHa  are self-reported happiness (or a proxy for 
positive emotion) of individual i in treatment j before and after watching the video clip, 
respectively; and ijtreatmentH _ is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the subject watched 
the “Happy” video (the H-treatment) and 0 if the subject watched the “Neutral” video (the N-
treatment). The parameters jα0 , jα1 , and jα2 represent the happiness of the control group 
before watching the neutral video, after watching the video, and the within-person difference 
pre- and post-watching the neutral video, respectively. While the parameters jβ0  and jβ1  
measure the respective pre- and post-video differences in self-reported happiness between the 
7
 From these regressions (reported in Table A.1, Appendix A), we find that the coefficient of the variable “amount sent by Person A” is 
significantly and negatively correlated with moral ratings, suggesting that, as the amount Person A sent to Person B in the TRUST condition 
increased, subjects became increasingly condemning toward Person B. We reach the same conclusion for the GEG condition: Subjects were 
more condemning toward Person B when Person A offered a higher wage. 
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control group and the treated group, respectively, the parameter jβ2  captures the treatment 
effect of the “Happy” video on the happiness of the treated.  
Table 5 presents, for both conditions, ordinary least-squares estimates on the happiness 
equations. Both columns indicate that there was virtually no difference in the means of 
happiness between the control and the treated group before watching the assigned video clip 
in either of the two conditions; the coefficients on H-treatment are statistically insignificantly 
different from zero in the Hb equations. After watching the clip, however, there was a marked 
difference in the average happiness (i.e., Ha): Subjects in the H-treatment group reported, on 
average, an approximately 0.8-point higher level of happiness on the seven-point happiness-
intensity scale than the control group. For example, in the TRUST condition, the average 
happiness for the control group was approximately 4.833, and the coefficient on the H-
treatment was 0.135, i.e., the average happiness for the treated group pretreatment was 
approximately 4.833 + 0.135 = 4.968. The average happiness for the control group remained 
approximately the same at 5.028 after the video clip (Ha), whereas the average happiness for 
the treated was approximately 5.028 + 0.940 = 5.968. The coefficient on H-treatment in the 
Ha − Hb equation then represents the treatment effect on the treated subjects. For example, 
the TRUST condition indicates that watching the “Happy” video clip resulted in a net 
increase in the happiness level of the treated by 0.940 − 0.135 = 0.805, which is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The same qualitative findings apply for the GEG 
condition.8 
In short, we can conclude from this analysis that the “Happy” video was successful at 
inducing a significant increase in the positive moods for the treated. The question is: Will we 
be able to observe significant changes to how people rate moral judgments in different 
scenarios alongside these changes in positive moods? 
Can Induced Positive Emotions Explain Differences in Moral Judgments across Treatments?
—We start by looking at differences in moral judgments in the TRUST condition. First, we 
provide the average moral judgments for each of the two conditions 
8
 When we perform the same econometric analysis including “contentment” as the dependent variable in the regression models of Table 
5, we find similar results to those reported in the case of happiness. The only difference is that the coefficient of the H-treatment in the third 
equation is only marginally statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.107). 
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across treatments and then compare them (using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to determine 
any differences before and after the video clip. Figure 4 illustrates the average moral ratings 
as a function of each scenario separately before and after the video clip was shown to 
subjects. We observe that all four moral evaluation functions (before and after the video clip) 
are negatively sloped: The more prosocial Person A became by sending to Person B higher 
amounts as we moved toward scenario 5, the more strongly Person B’s behavior was judged 
as morally wrong. In particular, before (after) the neutral video clip was shown, average 
moral judgments started at a level of 7.259 (12.185) in scenario 1 and became −37.241 
(−37.537) in scenario 5. The same pattern was observed in average moral judgment before 
(after) the happy video clip was shown. Another feature of the moral evaluation functions in 
the TRUST condition is that, in the first two scenarios (where Person A sends £0 and £5 to 
Person B, respectively), Person B’s behavior was perceived to be morally praiseworthy, 
irrespective of whether the neutral or the happy video clip was shown. 
 
We next tested for any differences in moral judgments between treatments. Figure 4 
indicates that, in the TRUST condition, subjects’ moral ratings were similar in the N-
treatment before and after watching the video clip, but that they became less judgmental in 
their ratings in the H-treatment after they had been exposed to the happy video clip. To assess 
whether differences were statistically different, we performed a Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
for the equality of matched pairs of observations (within-subjects test). Table 6 reports the 
corresponding p-values from the pairwise comparisons of each of the five scenarios before 
and after the video clip for each treatment, separately. Our analysis reveals that, on average, 
subjects in scenarios 1, 2, and 5 reported moral judgments that were not statistically 
significantly different from each other either before or after the video clip had been shown. In 
contrast, in scenarios 3 and 4, subjects reported similar moral judgments toward Person B 
after they watched the neutral video, but they became significantly less judgmental by rating 
Person B’s action in a less reprehensible manner after they watched the happy video. 
We next examine for potential changes in moral judgments in the GEG condition. As 
shown in Figure 5, the descriptive features of the MEF in this condition are similar to those 
observed in the TRUST condition. First, the shape of the MEF in all four combinations 
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(before and after the video clip) is negatively sloped, implying that subjects became 
increasingly judgmental of Person B for choosing the lowest possible effort as Person A 
increased the wage. Second, choosing the lowest effort level was considered to be a 
praiseworthy action, conditional on Person A choosing a low wage (equal to either £5 or 
£10). In these two scenarios, in most cases average moral ratings were above zero. In 
addition, the MEF in the H-treatment is always above the corresponding MEF in the N-
treatment. Table 7 reports the average moral ratings along with the corresponding p-values 
from a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for each scenario comparison and treatment, 
separately. 
In all scenarios, subjects were assigning higher moral ratings toward Person B, 
thus indicating that they became less judgmental of Person B’s egotistical behaviors 
immediately after watching the happy video clip. The differences between scenarios 
were statistically significant at the one percent level in all cases, except for scenario 5, in 
which average moral ratings were similar before and after the happy video clip. To test 
whether these differences can be attributed to the manipulation of positive moods, we 
also performed pairwise comparisons across scenarios after subjects watched the neutral 
video clip. Our analysis indicates that average moral ratings were statistically insignificant 
in most scenarios (namely, scenarios 3–5). Regarding scenarios 1 and 2, significant 
differences in moral judgments were observed at the five percent level. We summarize our 
third finding below. 
Finding 3.—The differences in induced positive emotions can explain differences in 
moral judgments: Induced positive emotions led to subjects assigning less judgmental moral 
ratings both in the TRUST and in the GEG condition. 
III. Conclusions
This study experimentally investigated the links between positive emotions and moral 
judgments in trust and gift exchange games. These games have played a central role in the 
social preference literature, and their frequent occurrence in real-world economic and social 
phenomena makes them fruitful for the empirical analysis of moral judgments. In particular, 
the relationship between employers and employees in labor markets is characterized by 
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positive reciprocity incentives: Employees who perform their jobs satisfactorily are rewarded 
with higher wages. We examined the extent to which violation of the wage–effort hypothesis 
(by having one player always choosing the minimum effort level, irrespective of the wage 
offered by the employer) and trust is perceived to be morally condemning by impartial 
observers, and examined how positive emotions affect how moral appraisals of a given 
situation are expressed. 
Our main findings indicate that, on average, subjects perceive selfish behaviors to have a 
moral dimension. In particular, most subjects increase their moral condemnation toward the 
selfish actor the more prosocial the behavior of his co-player becomes. Interestingly, if an 
employer offers a low wage to the employee, shirking is perceived to be morally 
praiseworthy. 
We also observe that positive emotions are linked with moral judgments: (a) Subjects who 
report to be happier and more content make less negative moral appraisals for a given 
scenario; and (b) induced positive emotions lead subjects to arrive at less negative moral 
conclusions of selfish behavior. 
Our findings provide a number of implications and indicate future research avenues. First, 
we provide evidence that selfishness is typically considered by an average impartial observer 
as a morally reprehensible act, and increasingly so as the other player becomes increasingly 
more prosocial toward the selfish actor. This increasing moral condemnation may be a motive 
behind the choice of employees to spend high effort levels when they receive higher wages. 
The extent to which moral judgments and actual behavior is linked is an open empirical 
question for further studies seeking to bridge the gap between moral psychology and applied 
economics. A second implication is that moral judgments appear to be themselves functions 
of positive emotions. This finding adds to the existing strand of literature that highlights the 
importance of emotions in economic decision making. Third, induced positive affects 
moderate the moral judgments of other people’s selfish behaviors in a certain direction: They 
lead subjects to make less negative moral appraisals. Whether induced negative emotions 
would generate the opposite effect is an interesting challenge for future research. 
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Figure 1: Reason-based vs. Emotion-based model 
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Eliciting 
situation Judgment Reasoning
Eliciting 
situation Reasoning Judgment
Figure 2: Timeline of tasks within a condition 
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Table 1: Number of participants in each treatment and condition 
H-treatment N-treatment 
TRUST 63 54 
GEG 66 54 
Total 129 108 
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Figure 3: The moral evaluation function condition before the video clip 
(a) TRUST condition 
34.18
1.7164.10
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(b) GEG condition
76.67
1.67
21.67
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Table 2: Proportion of subjects in each category and treatment before the video-clip 
Subjects with 
negatively sloped 
MEF 
Subjects with flat 
MEF Others 
TRUST 64.10% 1.71% 34.18% 
GEG 76.67% 1.67% 21.67% 
Note: We divide subjects into three categories (response patterns): (1) subjects with a negatively sloped MEF, 
(2) subjects with a flat MEF and (3) “Others”, including non-monotonic subjects and subjects with a positively 
sloped MEF. 
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Table 3: Mean self-reported emotions before the video clip in the TRUST and the GEG 
condition 
TRUST GEG 
Happiness 4.906 
(1.218) 
5.058 
(1.040) 
Envy 2.329 
(1.452) 
2.383 
(1.462) 
Anger 1.897 
(1.417) 
1.842 
(1.341) 
Boredom 2.577 
(1.406) 
2.533 
(1.289) 
Contentment 4.530 
(1.562) 
4.333 
(1.491) 
Irritation 2.496 
(1.563) 
2.217 
(1.271) 
N 117 120 
Note: Mean self-reported emotions (before the video clip) with the corresponding standard deviations (in 
parentheses) for each condition separately. The intensity for each emotion was recorded on a 7-point scale (1 = 
“not at all”, ... , 7 = “very much”). 
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Table 4: Emotions and moral judgments for each condition before the video clip was 
shown 
VARIABLES TRUST 
(1) 
Moral Judgment 
GEG 
(2) 
Moral Judgment 
Scenario 2 -4.137 -10.908** 
[3.278] [2.526] 
Scenario 3 -28.462** -22.783** 
[2.971] [2.651] 
Scenario 4 -37.419** -32.633** 
[2.881] [2.744] 
Scenario 5 -45.957** -44.225** 
[2.987] [2.958] 
Happiness 1.738* -0.353 
[0.787] [0.845] 
Contentment -0.842 1.483* 
[0.572] [0.596] 
Gender (= 1 if female) 0.677 -2.415 
[1.996] [1.787] 
Field of study (=1 if economics) -3.779+ 0.357 
[2.234] [2.600] 
Nationality (= 1 if British) -4.513* -5.952** 
[1.884] [1.814] 
Constant 5.169 11.031* 
[5.189] [5.117] 
N 585 600 
Note: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. The dependent variable “Moral 
Judgment” denotes the moral rating that subjects assigned in a given scenario. The independent variables 
Scenario 2, Scenario 3, Scenario 4 and Scenario 5 take on the value “1” when Person A sends an amount (offers 
a wage) of £5 (£10), £10 (£15), £15 (£20) and £20 (£25) to Person B, respectively; 0 otherwise. The baseline 
category is Scenario 1 (Person A sends an amount (offers a wage) of £0 (£5) to Person B). + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; 
** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Differences in self-reported happiness before and after watching the video-clip 
across treatments 
TRUST GEG 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Hb Hb 
H-treatment 0.135 -0.130 
[0.230] [0.191] 
Constant 4.833** 5.130** 
[0.184] [0.140] 
VARIABLES Ha Ha 
H-treatment 0.940** 0.827** 
[0.229] [0.243] 
Constant 5.028** 4.870** 
[0.191] [0.181] 
VARIABLES Ha-Hb Ha-Hb 
H-treatment 0.806** 0.956** 
[0.182] [0.234] 
Constant 0.194 -0.259 
[0.130] [0.185] 
N 117 120 
Note: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. The dependent variable Hb 
(Ha) denotes the self-reported level of happiness before (after) the video clip is shown; whereas, the dependent 
variable Ha – Hb indicates the difference between the self-reported levels of happiness after and before the 
video clip is shown. The independent variable “H-treatment” takes on the value 1 if the “Happy” video-clip is 
shown and 0 if the “Neutral” video-clip is shown. + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
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Figure 4: The mean moral evaluation function before and after the video-clip of the TRUST 
condition 
28 
Table 6: Average moral ratings in the TRUST condition for each scenario and treatment 
N-treatment 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Before 7.259 2.481 -19.463 -28.852 -37.241 
After 12.185 3.241 -19.981 -28.704 -37.537 
p-value 0.1060 0.3123 0.3956 0.4914 0.9768 
H-treatment 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Before 8.429 4.841 -21.524 -30.111 -38.778 
After 12.476 5.635 -17.651 -26.952 -36.460 
p-value 0.1149 0.2308 0.0015 0.0113 0.1351 
Note: p-values from a two-sided Wilcoxon sign-rank test are reported. 
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Figure 5: The mean moral evaluation function before and after the video-clip of the GEG 
condition 
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Table 7: Average moral ratings in the GEG condition for each scenario and treatment 
N-treatment 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Before 13.741 3.315 -10.593 -19.778 -32.944 
After 15.852 6.426 -8.796 -18.963 -30.574 
p-value 0.0223 0.0236 0.3322 0.5703 0.5693 
H-treatment 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Before 9.591 -1.712 -11.924 -22.318 -32.621 
After 13.682 4.455 -6.652 -19.667 -30.273 
p-value 0.0018 0.0001 0.0033 0.0045 0.2273 
Note: p-values from a two-sided Wilcoxon sign-rank test are reported. 
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 Appendix A – Additional Regression Analysis 
Table A.1: Emotions and moral judgments for each condition before the video clip was 
shown 
VARIABLES TRUST GEG 
Amount sent by Person A -2.504** 
[0.132] 
Wage offered by Person A -2.204** 
[0.128] 
Happiness 1.738* -0.353 
[0.794] [0.843] 
Contentment -0.842 1.483* 
[0.573] [0.595] 
Gender (= 1 if female) 0.677 -2.415 
[2.010] [1.783] 
Field of study (= 1 if economics) -3.779+ 0.357 
[2.222] [2.592] 
Nationality (= 1 if British) -4.513* -5.952** 
[1.910] [1.810] 
Constant 7.014 21.974** 
[4.885] [5.189] 
N 585 600 
Note: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in square brackets. In all regressions, the 
dependent variable is “Moral Judgment” and denotes the moral rating that subjects assigned in a given scenario. 
The independent variable “Amount sent by Person A” (“Wage offered by Person A”) takes the value “x” when 
Person A sends an amount (offers a wage) of £x, where “x” takes on the values 0 (5), 5 (10), 10 (15), 15 (20), 20 
(25). + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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